The question of moral status – whether an entity is capable of moral implications – is central to ethical discourse, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. This paper critically examines the argument that intentionality is both necessary and sufficient for moral status, focusing specifically on Deborah G Johnson's(2006) claim that AI systems, despite lacking intentions, possess intentionality and thus warrant the status of moral entities. This paper argues that while Johnson's distinction between intentionality and intentions is conceptually valid and potentially significant for addressing the nuanced ethical implications of AI, her argument falls short because she does not adequately demonstrate that AI systems genuinely possess intentionality in the relevant sense. The framework of intentionality proposed by Hintikka is used here to argue that the description of intentionality relevant for moral status likely requires more than mere behavioral directedness. The paper further analyzes the "Chinese Room" argument to show how the directedness in the behaviour can be achieved without having a corresponding internal mental state. This paper concludes that current AI systems do not provide sufficient evidence of possessing genuine intentionality that indicates moral status, yet in a limited sense to have ascribed intentionality as directedness.
