In his new book, Darwall draws a principled distinction between attitudes of the will (including resentment, guilt, and blame) and attitudes of the heart (including anger, remorse, and gratitude), and argues that one cannot have any obligation to have the latter. Focusing on remorse, I argue that, pace Darwall, wrongdoers can be obligated to experience remorse for their wrongdoing. I begin by elucidating the distinct healing power of heartfelt remorse in repairing wrongs, by showing how it affirms what victims hold most precious: their lives, their legitimate interests, and the significance of their loss. I then argue that wrongdoers have an obligation to feel remorse toward their victims, because they are obligated to fully understand the significance of their wrongs, which requires them to register what is precious to the victims. I further address Darwall’s two-fold objection to such an obligation. More generally, since our preciousness—which underpins attitudes of the heart—and our legitimate claims—which ground attitudes of the will—are deeply intertwined, with the latter ultimately dependent on the former, I question whether Darwall’s strict division of attitudes of the will as deontic and attitudes of the heart as non-deontic can be sustained.
