The present paper aims at manifesting the weaknesses that arise from the ontological interpretation and grounding of the radical imaginary in the work of Castoriadis. The perception of praxis as the incessant creation of a plethora of significations by means of the radical imaginary, as Habermas points out, allows neither praxis’s interpretation in terms of an intersubjective practice nor the distinction between meaning and its normative validity. If the radical imaginary may give birth both to autonomy and heteronomy, good and evil, how can a normative account of the concept of praxis be given? The paper will attempt to argue that the role the imagination plays in the formulation of the reflective judgments in Kant’s Critique of Judgment in light of H. Arendt’s interpretation of Kant, overcomes the aporias of the Castoriadis’s ontological grounding of the radical imaginary by linking the normative validity of judgments with the intersubjective communication of the social actors.
