At the base of Ronchi’s The Minor Canon, there are two fundamental theses: i) the experience is not attributable to the consciousness of the subject, but to an impersonal background (the monstrous); ii) the act precedes the potency and is accomplished in itself. I argue that in his theses two risks can be identified: a) once all the experience she has with the impersonal has been identified, the personal singularity becomes something similar to a hologram; b) if we conceive the act as something in itself already fully accomplished, then the concept of creation becomes problematic at least in the sense proposed by Bergson, that is, as a process in which everything is not given at once. The thesis that I argue in this contribution is twofold: 1) the personal singularity is distinct from the self-referential subject; 2) a double overcoming of the self-referential subject is possible: not only in the direction of the “monstrous” (as Ronchi pro-poses in the wake of Schopenhauer), but also in the direction of the level of experience that corresponds to personal singularity.
