The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today
too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion
of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of
civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues,
provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper
proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and
their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two
main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant
theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show
that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explainThe aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today
too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion
of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of
civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues,
provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper
proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and
their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two
main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant
theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show
that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explain
