The empiricist tradition has strongly questioned the “classical” conception of man, centered on concepts such as “substance”, “soul”, “person”. The names of Locke, Hume and Hobbes give a clear idea of the radical significance of that breaking phase, the heritage of which is now evident in all forms taken by reductivist naturalism. This essay briefly reviews the reasons which, firstly, led to the framing of the concept of person, and those which, then, led to its criticism. Special attention is given to the contribution of recent enquiries in neuroscience, and, particularly, to the ethical and anthropological implications of deflationist approaches to the concepts of person and to the related concepts of identity and subjectivity. Finally, the last parts suggest that humanity should be given an integral (and inclusive) look, which should both host the cognitive contributions offered by all the disciplines which investigate the visible, and to reevaluate the need for the invisible. Moreover, this calls for an attempt to rethink reality through a hylemorphic conception, in the light of the latest achievements of the sciences.
