What constitutes the core of the writings of Carmelo Vigna on moral philosophy is the attempt to resume the discourse of desire by grasping the most true tension within the structure of the original intersubjectivity, analyzed therefore in its transcendentality. In this essay I focuse on some pages of his book Ethics of Desire as Ethics of Recognition above all on one of the "Appendices to Part Two", the one titled "On the fragility of our relationship to the good". The risk of dealing with good is high because it implies reliance and reliance on someone, this results in priority and principality being given to the recognition relationship and hence to the desire for recognition, with regard to any other form of relationship and, much more, than any desire to something. The alternative between recognition and misrecognition is the source of the alternative beetween good and evil. The recognition processes begin with participation in the life of a culture, that is human life in its own right. Freedom is such that the basic recognition of life itself or the preservation of life, can be denied, misrecognized. So a first good, from which somehow all others depend, is the preservation of the original freedom and then its development as the possibility of human morality. But this possibility implies that freedom chooces itself, that is, chooces life and recognition.
