Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Aristotle for his failure to account for the person who forms a perfectly clear-headed akratic intention, and yet she agrees with him that the weak-willed do not make what he calls a ‘choice’. She concludes that akratic intentions are not rational, for an intention is rational only when it is conducive to or a part of what one ‘regards as doing well’. Based on the ‘brute facts’ of practice that provide the ‘context of normal procedure’ for human action, akrasia is simply an error in practical reasoning. However, Anscombe also assumes that intentions are analogous to orders, but if they have the same mode of operation then, as I shall try to show, the intention to φ is rational insofar as there is a binding reason to φ and one is trying to get φ, regardless of whether there are more important reasons (or intentions) to ¬φ. Hence, an akratic intention is rational, and a valid feature of everyday practice.
