This essay evaluates Corradetti’s compelling assertion that the “primary aim” of his Relativism and Human Rights “is that of reconstructing some central concepts of the Hegelian understanding of the right and of providing a post-metaphysical reinterpretation of the notion of recognition in terms of a dialectical process, granting fundamental rights within the context of an institutional discursive model of rationality.” The discussion is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviews Hegel’s reception of the tradition of natural right, asserting that the latter plays a role in Hegel’s recognitive account of ethical life greater than Corradetti allows. Part 2 considers the use Corradetti makes of Hegel’s concept of dialectical negativity, arguing that, while it can and should be understood in terms of relations of recognition and, especially, misrecognition, it also articulates features of Hegel’s logic and metaphysics that – pace Corradetti – can play a role in a postmetaphysical theory of social life. Part 3 seconds Corradetti’s claims about the value of recognition theory for a Hegelian account of universal human rights, but asserts that that value is best expressed via an intercultural understanding of that account. Part 4 details the normative dimension of such an account, arguing that here, too, Hegel has more to offer than Corradetti allows.
