In my discussion of Adriano Fabris’ Etica e ambiguità [Ethics and Ambiguity], I will consider three main objections. 1) Firstly, I will discuss Fabris’ attempt to criticize and reshape the Aristotelian ἔλεγχος, as it appears in the fourth book of Metaphysics, from a performative perspective, showing that it already falls within, and is substantially invalidated by, the semantic domain of Aristotle’s distinction between “contradiction” and “self-contradicting”. 2) Secondly, since Fabris invokes a reform of Western philosophy’s general attitude towards action and relation, I will show how classic ontology (notably Plato’s notions of being, as opposed to Parmenides’, and dialectics) already provides a robust example of a deeply relational (though admittedly not performative in the sense highlighted by Fabris) notion of being. 3) Thirdly, I criticize Fabris’ notion of relation, because it indifferently refers both to ontology and ethics, whereas a proper ethical consideration of it, while necessarily involving ontology, should be treated as distinct from the former.
