The present contribution aims to establish a connection between the notion of “autonomous
discursive practice” recently introduced by Robert Brandom and the notion of personal
autonomy. The Locke Lectures underscore some central points to be considered in
this context. (1) There are basic capacities which ground human rationality and are sufficient
to develop an autonomous discursive practice. (2) These capacities are not logical in
a formal sense but reveal a notion of material incompatibility that allow the agents to recognize
and rectify doxastic commitments as well as practical commitments. (3) The practice
of recognition and rectification of commitments implies a social dimension because
only through the undertaking of specific deontic attitudes in intersubjective contexts of
justification we can isolate the complete structure of expressive rationality. We need both
the objective pole (modal vocabulary) and the subjective pole (normative vocabulary).
My conclusion is that the Brandomian analysis of autonomous linguistic practice puts to
much emphasis on the recognition of contents according to modal vocabulary. Moreover,
personal autonomy requires the consideration of the role of the deontic attitudes in the
practices of justification of our validity claims.
