This paper examines the ethical implications of Emilio Corriero’s non-substantial ontology, developed in response to the ecological crisis of the Anthropocene. In this framework, nature is no longer treated as a mere object but is understood as a subject in which human beings participate. I do not assess the internal consistency of this ontology; instead, I ask what moral duties and forms of responsibility it is supposed to generate. I argue that the move from a “substantial” ontology, which treats nature as an object, to a “non-substantial” ontology, which treats nature as a subject, does not yield clear normative guidance. On the contrary, it can ground both anti-anthropocentric environmental ethics and strongly anthropocentric, techno-optimistic positions. I also show that the motivational problem remains: even if humans recognize themselves as part of nature, it does not follow that they will act in ways that protect it. Finally, I consider proposals of moral bioenhancement—including pharmacological and psychedelic means—aimed at producing a sense of unity with nature. I argue that Corriero leaves open a crucial question: whether these forms of engineered “communion with nature” should be seen as morally legitimate or as contrary to human dignity. Ultimately, recognizing that we are nature does not yet tell us what we ought to do.
