Centralisation of powers typically occurs in times of crisis. The paper investigates and compares the intergovernmental relations (IGRs) in the Italian decentralised systems during the economic and financial crisis
(2008–2013) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022). During both these two phases, Italy experienced
a transition from a political government to a technical one. During the economic and financial crisis, Silvio
Berlusconi’s government (2008–2011) was succeeded by a technical one led by Mario Monti (2011–2013);
similarly, during the pandemic, Giuseppe Conte’s government (2020–2021) was followed by a technical
one led by Mario Draghi (2021–2022). The hypothesis is that the presence of ‘political’ governments still
guarantees a certain degree of cooperation with lower levels of government (i.e. regional and local administrations), while ‘technical’ governments further exacerbate the centralisation of powers. The paper analyses
the legislative activities of the central government and the documents of the Italian ‘conference system’
during the two periods of analysis. According to our hypothesis, the findings show a greater centralisation of power under the technical government during the pandemic, but not during the economic crisis.
This outcome suggests that the policy domain may serve as a main intervening factor over the degree of
centralization of the IGRs during periods of crisis.
