The paper examines some of the main theses of John Finnis’ book Natural Law and Natural Rights as well as Pauline Westerman’s criticism. The focus lies on Finnis’ claim to give a purely philosophical, i.e. non-metaphysical, non-theological, and non-naturalist foundation of universal natural rights on the basis of an interpretation of Aquinas’ theory of the lex naturalis. Following Westerman in some respects, I will argue that there are some systematic problems embedded in Finnis’ interpretation of Aquinas, especially concerning the question of how to justify the contents of the basic goods. However, I will show that Westerman in return overstresses the importance of a metaphysical and theological framework in Aquinas. The final partof the paper therefore suggests an alternative reading of Aquinas’ theory of the lex naturalis, stressing the systematic meaning of nature as reason and the importance of the ‘synderesis’ (‘conscience’) for Aquinas’ approach.
