Are ordinary moral agents able to follow the moral lead of heroes and saints? In her
Exemplarist Moral Theory Linda Zagzebski provided an exemplarist account to morality
grounded on admiration. She focused her research on three possible kinds of exemplar: the
saint, the hero and the sage. In this paper, I hold that there are at least two possible ways of
following an exemplar (inference and strict emulation). Furthermore, I will try to show that
when we take morally exceptional agents (in particular heroes and saints) as exemplars to
be emulated, some theoretical and normative problems arise. In particular, I will outline
the Feasibility Problem, the Non-motivating Admiration Problem and the Distortion of
Duty. Given these issues, I suggest an account of supererogation for this moral approach. I
argue that this will provide some theoretical advantages for exemplarism, together with a
new attention for extraordinary moral acts. The admiration of praiseworthy deeds,
similarly to exemplars, can provide valuable moral guidance.
