The question at issue in the present essay is whether there is a reason to doubt the seemingly
indubitable fact that the function of interpretive justifications of judges and lawyers is to
show that certain interpretive judgments are correct. The conclusion is that there is a reason
to doubt this fact: the reason is that judges and lawyers do not seem to attribute this function
to their interpretive justifications, because their justifications do not have the content
which is needed to perform such a function. Four theses are developed to support this conclusion.
First, there are three meanings in which interpretive judgments could be said correct:
grounded on facts; grounded on norms belonging to the legal system; grounded on moral
norms. Second, an examination of interpretive argumentation indicates that interpretive
judgments are to be conceived as moral judgments, whose correctness depends on moral
norms. Third, to claim that an interpretive judgment is correct, the interpretive justification
which is offered must have a premise that states a methodological principle, i.e. a moral norm
prescribing a hierarchy of interpretive arguments to be used to attribute a meaning to legal
texts. Fourth, the premise that states a certain methodological principle is a missing element
in the interpretive justifications of judges and lawyers.
