In Resp. 509c7 and 9 Socrates declares that he has omitted many things
in the exposition of the analogy between the supreme Good and the sun. In fact
Socrates’ exposition leaves some questions open which are seminal with regard to the
interpretation of the aforesaid analogy : 1) Why Plato designates the sun as analogon
of the Good ? 2) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists in a plurality
of intelligible beings ? 3) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists not
only in a purely objective intelligible being (νοητόν), but also in an intellect (νοῦς),
that is in a form of consciousness ? 4) How can be explained the fact that Plato
perceives the Good as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical reality ?
While the first question can be simply answered by referring to the infinite manifestativity
of the Good, the other three questions require a significant effort in the
field of speculation. Basing on some clues given by Plato in the exposition of the
analogy between the Good and the sun, this article attempts to answer these questions
by conjecturing that Plato could have presupposed the image of an infinite sphere
consisting in intelligible light. This image, which could have already been presupposed
by Parmenides, would offer a conceptual background capable of explaining on
the one hand the unity of intelligibility (being) and intellect (consciousness)
characterizing the original manifestation of the Good, on the other hand why in
Plato’s perspective the Good can be perceived as origin not only of intelligible, but
also of physical light.
