This paper offers an historical analysis of the role of moral exemplarity in Thomas
Aquinas‟ thought, in order to contribute to the current discussion on moral Exemplarism.
First, I will argue that, by combining Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, Aquinas‟ ethics
amounts to a peculiar exemplarist theory of the virtues. The Aristotelian emphasis on the
phronimos, combined with the Neoplatonic exitus -reditus conceptual schema, results – I
will argue – in an account of the degrees of virtue which grounds a form of theological
exemplarism. Then, I will claim that, in order to make sense of Aristotle‟s own ethical
dynamism, an understanding of the development of virtue by degrees is needed. By means
of such an understanding, I will show that the distance separating Aquinas‟ and Aristotle‟s
account of virtue development significantly reduces. Thanks to this analysis, I will finally
support a model of virtue development grounded both in moral exemplarity and in an
ideal of dynamic unity of the virtues.
