European Central Bank, National Constitutional Adjudication and the European Court of Justice: Latest developments from the “European case-law” of the German Constitutional Court

The contribution analyses the key steps of the reasoning of the BVerfG in its recent Bankenunion (2019) and PSPP/Weiss (2020) judgments. The authors illustrate the steps marked by the Federal Constitutional Court in the fine-tuning of its theoretical design of the different models of ultra vires and identity review, and compare the different outcomes of the two cases. In conclusion, they suggest that the reluctance of a national Court to engage in a confrontation with the CJEU (such as the one shown by the BVerfG in Bankenunion) seems more dangerous than an explicit refusal to apply EU law (as the BVerfG did in PSPP/Weiss). And indeed, even harsh ruptures may be sorted out through the interplay of the concerned institutions, while the creeping evasion from the jurisdiction of the CJUE might threaten the consistent application of EU law.