In this paper I analyze critically real cases of actions, often deemed “supererogatory” in the context of bioethics and medical ethics, in order to assess whether it is appropriate to classify them in this way. More specifically, I try to discuss the moral legitimacy of a consequence of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), i.e., the freezing of the so-called supernumerary embryos, and their “adoption”, focusing on the possibility of it being a supererogatory action. The hypothesis of this paper is that we often misuse “supererogation” to describe actions that do not have a clear moral connotation, since it is offered as a “shortcut” to resolve moral issues without clearly defining the issues at stake. In order to determine whether “embryo adoption” can be defined as “supererogatory”, indeed, we have first to assess its morality and then get back to the definition of supererogation given by Heyd. Once acknowledged that embryo adoption is not a supererogatory action, I conclude with some anthropological and ethical considerations about this bioethical solution. Furthermore, I suggest that the misuse of supererogation, far from helping the development of an ethical theory, should create a kind of moral dichotomy among ordinary and extraordinary (heroic) way of acting. In these regards, ethics does not need any heroism or sanctity. Too many times, thus, supererogation is supererogatory, especially in the field of bioethics.
