BOCHUMER PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR ANTIKE UND MITTELALTER
Abstract
In Plato's Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both
as transcending every form of being (509b9-10) and as the supreme Idea, that is
to say as the supreme being. The seeming inconsistency between these two
characterizations could point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between
the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation (the Idea of
the Good): by revealing itself the "agathòn epékeina tês ousías" constitutes the
highest being and has to be therefore considered as identical with the "idéa tou agathoû"; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear
supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight
and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato's notion of the Good by help of
both the so-called "ágrapha dógmata" and the evidence concerning the Demiurge.
