The Yugoslav prime minister (and foreign minister), Milan Stojadinović, and Italian for-eign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, signed a friendship agreement on 25 March 1937, ush-ering in an atmosphere of confidence between the two formerly hostile countries. This rapprochement resulted from the changing international constellation: the resurgent Ger-many was expected to annex Austria and become a powerful neighbour to both countries. Ciano and Stojadinović struck close personal relations which no doubt buttressed the so-lidity of their agreement. Moreover, Ciano believed that Stojadinović was inclined towards authoritarian concept of power. There were also increasing signs that the Stojadinović regime was acquiring some fascist trappings in line with the new course of foreign policy. Indeed, Prince regent, Paul, dropped Stojadinović from the government in February 1939 because he came to believe that his premier was intent on becoming a fascist dictator. This paper will explore whether there was substance to the often repeated accusations that Stojadinović was sliding towards fascism. Much of these accusations were centred on his foreign policy, especially his cordial relations with the fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. Therefore, this paper will analyse, on the one hand, to what extent Stojadinović aligned Yugoslavia’s conduct of foreign affairs with Rome’s foreign policy and, on the other, to what degree the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in internal developments which might smack of fascism. The analysis will be un-dertaken with reference to the recent and influential theories of fascism.
