The debate on post-pandemic recovery policies revealed that the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric shocks on economic activity plays a significant role in the conventions governing the dialectics among EU political players. The representatives of individual member countries have indeed introjected a ‘rule’ according to which a member country in economic trouble has the right to receive aid from EU partners only if its trouble is caused by a symmetric disturbance, i.e. a shock simultaneously hitting all member countries. The rationale behind this lies in a sort of ‘responsibility principle’, according to which aid is justified only in the absence of negligence on the part of the recipient. Within this framework, a mere local shock would be evidence of negligence. Grounding on a very influential stream of literature, we argue that this principle conflicts with the peculiar mechanics of an economy integrated on a continental level. Local shocks are a natural consequence of a high degree of sectoral specialization of a country’s economy, and consequently no one can be blamed for them. Counterbalancing the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks is then the primary task of supranational governance institutions, when market adjustments are not enough. Furthermore, this task becomes increasingly important as time goes by, because member countries’ sectoral specialization tends to deepen as economic integration proceeds.
