This contribution examines Karl Marx’s empirical and theoretical analysis of economic crises, particularly the 1857 global financial crisis, through his unpublished notebooks (Books of Cri-sis and London Notebooks). The study highlights Marx’s methodological shift from purely phi-losophical abstractions (influenced by Hegel) to a rigorous empirical approach, combining quantitative data, statistical tables, and press clippings to decode the cyclical nature of capitalist economies. Its aim is to emphasize Marx’s focus on the interplay between economic crises and political rule, particularly in France under Napoleon III’s Bonapartist regime. Contrary to a de-terministic approach, Marx observed how state intervention—through monetary policies, public spending, and credit manipulation—could temporarily mitigate crises, stabilize markets, and prolong authoritarian regimes. The article underscores Marx’s nuanced view of Bonapartism as both a repressive and modernizing force, capable of managing crises while exacerbating social contradictions.
