This paper raises a question about the unity of the second-personal in Stephen Darwall’s work. In particular, I explore this question at two levels. At the metanormative level, I ask: if reactive attitudes now come in two distinct kinds, what explains the overall unity of the second-personal? At the normative level, I ask: are the ‘non-deontic attitudes of the heart’ really as independent from the ‘deontic attitudes of the will’ as Darwall claims? To explore the metanormative question, I make explicit a tension in the Strawsonian background to Darwall’s account, a tension between a more Kantian and a more Humean approach to the normative. And to explore the normative question I focus on two conceptions of love. If we follow a Humean picture of love as a merely passive affect, then that account doesn’t do justice to Darwall’s rich account. Conversely, if we follow a more Kantian account of love as an active practical relationship, then the hard barriers Darwall erects between attitudes of the will and attitudes of the heart begin to soften.
