The aim of this paper is to see what kind of implications would an objectivist or a non-objectivist response to the research of a foundation for moral normativity have on our commonsensical usage of moral terms and on our ability to justify our moral action trough normative reasons (1.). In order to see the implications of objectivists and non-objectivists perspectives, I will focus on how normative reasons ground and justify moral actions from a first-person perspective (2.).
From an objectivist viewpoint, reasons can be conceived of as referring to what objectively ought to be done. From a non-objectivist viewpoint, on the other hand, if we claim that there are no grounds to justify our moral beliefs that something is right or wrong, then either we believe the normative level is a beneficial illusion that will survive scepticism at the metaethical level, or we take this scepticism to debunk morality entirely (3.).
