Genetic modification of non-human animals for use in human activities, including farming and research, may result in animals with reduced (or absent) capacity to experience stress and suf-fering compared to conspecifics currently used for the same purposes. It seems that creating “Cartesian animals” is a possibility that should be considered as a potentially desirable out-come, since reducing or eliminating suffering seems to be a goal shared by almost every ethical perspective, not just utilitarianism.Although initially appealing, such a perspective needs to be critically examined to ensure that its many implications are fully understood. One possible ap-proach is to determine whether it is consistent with existing frameworks for defining and as-sessing animal welfare. It is clear that using these techniques can be beneficial where there is a greater risk to animal welfare. However, to the extent that the concept of animal welfare re-quires animals to be considered as agents and these techniques would either limit or remove their capacity for agency, a number of critical issues can arise. Over-reliance on the potential of genetic editing may preclude achieving moral progress that would lead to a deeper rethinking of the relationship between humans and non-human animals. These techniques are undoubtedly promising. In certain contexts of human-animal interaction, they are worth recommending. However, they need to be carefully evaluated when implemented within the broader frame-work of human-animal relationships.
