In the last few years the problem of the influence of neuroscientific research on the juridical world has enjoyed a huge amount of interest, though the “neuroscience vs law” approach is sometimes unfold without a previous clarification of the conditions and the limits that permit a legitimate comparison between speeches and social practices (those under the general lables “sci-ence” and, respectively, “law”) originated and conducted within theoretical paradigms so dis-tant. In other words, very often the juxtaposition between “neuroscience” and “law”, as well as the speculations built on it, are led leaving unexpressed definitions and theoretical presupposi-tions about the concepts of “law” and “science” employed, trusting on a share of intuitive com-mon places about something which has been considered “essentially contested” instead.
Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, I will critically espose some epistemological issues emerged at the turn of the XX century, focusing on some reactions to the relativistic turn based on the (re-)discovery of the importance of the experimental side of every scientific enterprise. In my opinion, those proposals have given important insights that can help the clarification of a le-gitimate “scientific riductionism”; then, on those epistemological grounds, I will try to set the stage for a profitable discussion about the extra-theoretical use of scientific propositions, in par-ticular of those generated within current neuroscience researches to deal with specific juridical problems.
