After suggesting five ways in which Fichte’s philosophy can be regarded as a philosophy of action (§ 1) and explaining the systematic meaning of the primacy of the practical in Fichte (§ 2), this article focuses on the feeling that accompanies right action according to Fichte. In the Jena period (1793-1799), Fichte argues that the good and right action does not have enjoyment as its goal but is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction (Befriedigung) arising from the self-affirmation of the I as autonomous will and involving contempt for all enjoyment (§ 3). After the year 1800, Fichte speaks of “joy in doing” (Freude an dem Tun). Now, properly, the I is no longer the subject of action, but shows the genetic activity of “living” (Leben). “Joy in doing” associates with wisdom, that is, with the status when the will is realized as appeasement of the moral effort: having acquired the clear vision of absolute knowledge, the wise action is free in that it is independent not only from natural impulses but also from the categorical imperative that, being a law, still binds the action. Therefore, my thesis is that “joy in doing” is the feeling of the practical enactment of the doctrine of science as wisdom (§ 4).
