Analytic conceptions of truth can be broadly classified along two lines,
depending on how they answer the following two questions: 1. Has truth a substantial nature?
2. How many properties of truth are there? Traditional views, like correspondence, coherence,
pragmatist views all answer “yes” to both questions. The second half of the last century and
the last decades in particular, however, has witnessed the rapid growth in popularity of
conceptions of truth answering “no” to at least one. Pluralist views hold that there is more
than one property of truth, whereas deflationary views hold that truth lacks a substantial
nature. Pluralist and deflationary views are today the main rivals in the field. This book
focuses on deflationary views of truth and contributes to the general contemporary debate on
truth by addressing an issue emerging from an appealing way to clarify what the
insubstantiality o f (deflationary) t ruth might amount to: conservativeness.
