The 20th century was marked by a significant resurgence in practical philosophy, especially evident in the 1950s. Post-World War II, the focus shifted towards moral questions, driven by the fallout from totalitarian regimes. The key figures of the Reabilitierung der Praktischen Philosophie in Germany exemplify this trend. Similarly, in Britain, a return to practical philosophy emerged, moving beyond the dominance of logical empiricism and language philosophy. Notable philosophers like Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch reintroduced virtue ethics, grounded in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, marking a significant contemporary ethical movement. This essay will focus on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, a prominent trend in 20th-century philosophy. It aims to demonstrate that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a robust ethical and political framework that can address criticisms regarding its conception of justice. Despite concerns that virtue ethics may overlook universal ethical principles in favour of individual motives, the essay argues that virtue ethics offers a stronger and more nuanced perspective on justice than critics suggest.
