Public Disagreement about Uncontroversial Conclusions of Science in the Light of Cultural Cognition Theory: Making the Case for Civic Friendship as a Hybrid Epistemic and Moral Virtue

The aim of this article is to explore one of the possibilities of alleviating or countering problematic public disagreement about uncontroversial conclusions of science which is not in the domain of reasonable pluralism, i.e. those conclusions that are not controversial among the experts in the field. Using Dan Kahan’s theory of cultural cognition to identify the dominant cause of the problem - epistemic group polarisation, I suggest that one of the rectifying strategies that could be employed is based on the account of hybrid epistemic and moral virtues, as conceived by Miranda Fricker. Civic friendship is suggested as such a hybrid virtue which in addition to its moral component, also has significant epistemic benefits in alleviating the problem of public disagreement of the kind described in this article.