The article deals with the bioethical and biojuridical problems arising from the so called pharmacological neurocognitive enhancement, that is drugs and techniques, used not only to treat ill people, but also to modify, with intentional and direct interventions, the ‘normal’ mental and/or emotive activity of healthy people, so as to improve mental disposition (intelligence, short and long term memory) and emotional attitudes (mood, personality).
After a brief description of the social phenomenon (the current availability and diffusion of cognitive and mood enhancers), the article focuses on the theories and arguments for and against cognitive enhancement: the libertarian theory recognises the right ‘beyond’ therapy in the direction of ‘perfectionism’ that defends and exalts the new biotechnological potentials on human nature; the anti-perfectionist theories consider the search for ‘perfect health’ as a threat to human dignity and social justice.
In light of these theories and on the basis of the available scientific and empirical data (efficacy), the author provides a critical analysis of the main bioethical and biojuridical issues related to cognitive enhancement (safety and security, risk/benefit evaluation, role and goals of medicine, patient-physician relationship, freedom and authenticity, justice and solidarity).
