This article, taking its cue from the comments to the book entitled “Il dramma del giudizio”, develops a radically human conception of law by tracing its conceptual roots to the experience of judgment. Starting from a philosophical analysis of judgment as a situated and relational practice performed by finite rational agents, the paper argues that law cannot be adequately understood either as a purely objective, rule-based system or as the product of arbitrary subjectivity. Drawing primarily on a relational interpretation of Kantian autonomy, the article conceives normativity as originating in the intersubjective space constituted by the mutual recognition of human beings as ends in themselves. Judgment is thus presented as a paradigmatic legal experience in which autonomy, universality, and relationality converge. Against both technocratic disembodiment—exemplified by algorithmic decision-making—and subjectivist relativism, the article emphasizes the normative role of the self as rational and historically situated. This perspective allows for a critical rethinking of the foundations of law, highlighting its function as a relational device oriented toward justice understood not as a fixed content but as a dynamic tendency toward social coexistence. The radically human dimension of law ultimately emerges as a critical standard for evaluating contemporary transformations of legal practice and normativity.
