Deleuze has always fought the doctrine of judgment, arguing that a life can affirm itself on-ly by fighting against the judgment, namely the abominable power to segment and weaken the existence. At the same time, however, Deleuze has continually praised the jurispru-dence, which is the activity of judgment for excellence. It is a polarity between a low (mor-al) grade and a high (ethical) grade of the experience. In this paper, retracing the courses of the Eighties, I explore the ethical tenor of the jurisprudence, considered as a practice of the absence or of the problematic nature of the concept and as a selective action on social situ-ations. In second place, through the analysis of the relationship of the jurisprudence with the social normativity, I prove that the judicial creation is not necessarily progressive. Final-ly, I try to bring out the existence in Deleuze of a critique of jurisprudence attentive to the historicity of the ways of judgment and existence, which does not separate the inventive ca-pability of interpretation from the fact that it is also a function of power. At the end of this path it will be clear that the text of Deleuze allows to reassess the critical attitude of the phi-losophy of law, which has as a subject the socio-historical tenor of the exercise of justice, the ways in which the criteria of imputation are defined, the relative unconscious formations and subjective positions.
