The analogy between moral judgments and the evaluation of animals and plants is a pivotal feature of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism by means of which this metaethical position attempts to explain the naturalness of morality. However, the usual objection argues that the schema of natural normativity embraced by the main representatives of this view commits it to biological naturalism (a thesis that programmatically Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism rejects). This essay considers the contribution that John Hacker-Wright and Michael Thompson give in answering this challenge. They suggest a non empirical conception of the schema of natural normativity somehow different to the one endorsed by Rosalind Hursthouse. As a result, I will try to show that according to their notion of natural normativity, Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can maintain the thesis that moral judgments are analogous to the evaluation of animals and plants while avoiding the commitment to biological naturalism.
