In recent discussions regarding social epistemology, and especially among political philosophers, there has been a marked increase in the importance of the question of the epistemic justification of democracy, which ought to be, along ethical and political justification, a necessary condition of attaining democratic legitimacy. The newfound importance of the issue of the epistemic justification of democracy within political philosophy can be largely attributed to the works of Fabienne Peter, whose contribution is best illustrated through her successful melding of political and epistemological issues, a feat long evaded by many of her colleagues. According to Peter, the instrumentalizing nature of the standard approach to the epistemic justification of democracy fails to incorporate the irreducible pluralist value of individual agency and the procedural epistemic value of collective discussions.
Her proceduralist critiques of the standard approach to epistemic justification have rejected the justification of the inclusion of experts in democratic decision-making, maintaining that democracy can be epistemically justified without the involvement of experts in decision-making processes. Fabienne Peter has undoubtedly offered the best articulation of the proceduralist objection to the inclusion of experts in democratic decision-making. Once I have provided a summary of her argumentation, I will attempt to offer a critical review and elaborate an alternative approach to the democratic and epistemic justifications of including experts in decision-making processes.
