This paper treats some of the implications rising from neuroscience outcomes on the philosophical debate about free will. From a physicalist point of view (§1), I will first define the concepts of free will and determinism (§2) and then explain why the latter is a threat for freedom (§3). If we exercise our free will by our brain, then, I think, there are indeed two conflicting hypothesis. On the one side, if determinism is true, then freedom is an illusion. On the other side, if indeterminism is true, then freedom is a mystery (§4). As I will try to show, the first hypothesis seems to be the most plausible (§5). In conclusion, I will examine the theories supporting free will (§6) and also the sceptical critiques to them (§7). If there are not alternatives to physicalism, then the theoretical difficulties of libertarianism and compatibilism, together with neurosciences outcomes, lead us to embrace the sceptical positions about freedom.
