The place which belongs to Vittorio Benussi in the history of the phenomenological tradition is still not adequately defined today. The stereotypical image which still dominates the historiography is that of the follower of the School of Graz whose scientific contribution, while important, was destined to be absorbed in that, much more significant, contribution of the Gestalt School of Berlin. In actual fact, Benussi’s phenomenological model is significantly different from the Gestalt model: While the latter one is essentially static, Benussi’s model is essentially genetic – aimed at reconstructing the diachronic laws of development of the perceptual phenomena, their structuring of sense as they unfold in time. Benussi’s project for a genetic experimental phenomenology, despite its historical defeat, or perhaps thanks to it, proves today to possess extraordinary power and modernity in its capacity to create a dialogue between the phenomenological-experimental model and the one in current use today in psychology and in cognitive science – including the neurosciences
