Using the cases of coups d’état in Africa in the period 2000-2022, it is argued that in democratic regimes the coup is connected to the conditions of weak political institutionalisation and of centralisation of executive power. Some indicators of the institutionalisation of the political process (i.e. election regularity and relatively significant levels of government turnover) are associated with the unlikelihood of a coup or in any case with its probable failure. Conversely, where the political process is poorly institutionalised and the system features a high level of centralisation of executive power (i.e. “strong” presidents), coups d’état are more frequent and successful. In the case of authoritarianisms, some “factors of the regime” (a party, a closed bureaucracy, the military body or the apparatus of violence), in various combinations in concrete cases, can succeed in re-stabilising the political regime and prevent the coup or reduce its success rate. Coups d’état as “critical junctures” in democracy have effective consequences only in conditions of low institutionalisation of the regime and/or of high centralisation of the executive powers.
