The subject of this paper is the analysis of the political and diplomatic action of the Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, towards Yugoslavia and, more generally, the Balkan region, between 1936 and 1939. Contrary to the perception and the expectations of Mussolini, who, after the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, believed that Italy had become a leading power in the European and in the world theatre, the years ranging from the end of the Ethiopian conflict to the Italian entry into World War II were characterized by a notable decline in Italian influence in Eastern Europe.
The Italian ambitions of exclusive hegemony over the Balkan region were replaced, starting from the second half of the 1930s, with the more modest idea of an Italian-German condominium. This prompted Mussolini and Ciano to start improving rela-tions with Yugoslavia, which reached its peak with the signing of the agreements of March 25, 1937.
The beginning of the Second World War, in September 1939, occurred at the end of a process of progressive downsizing of the Italian influence in the Balkans to the advantage of the German one. Mussolini and Ciano’s response to the increasing German activism in that region consisted in the preparation and implementation of their plans for expansion in the Western Balkans. This choice was, however, on the Italian side, a sign of growing weakness: Italy, in fact, had to defend its Balkan sphere of influence not from the Western powers but from the German ally.
