Political liberalism, both in Rawls and in the subsequent tradition, takes as its point of departure the “fact of pluralism” of comprehensive doctrines, some of which are reasonable. But while the notion of reasonableness has received ample attention, the underlying model of pluralism has not. In this paper, we first analyze the Rawlsian understanding of pluralism and conclude that, because of its heavy focus on “doctrines”, it is overly intellectualistic and, as such, it fails to accurately describe the fractured nature of (especially) contemporary societies. Current social disagreements are often based on conflicting intuitions, feelings, or “vibes”, and they do not involve comprehensive, internally consistent systems of beliefs and values. This inadequacy in Rawls has its consequences, as a descriptively accurate account of contemporary pluralism presents a series of challenges for the typical formulations of political liberalism and some of its key concepts. In the second half of the paper, we elaborate these challenges for two of them: overlapping consensus and (un)reasonableness.
