This paper discusses Taraborrelli’s hypothesis that a cosmopolitan longing pervades Arendt’s thought, wondering if a cosmopolitanism without uprootedness is possible. This scope is pursued through Arendt’s themes of the “right to have rights” and the connection between power, law, and world. The first chapter examines the syntagm “right to have rights”, showing the distinct levels on which the first right - the only human right – lies, beyond and over the rights of the citizens. The second chapter discusses Rancière’s and Balibar’s reading of Arendt’s right to have rights; thus, it demonstrates that, while the two authors grasp the relevance of political action, they downplay the two levels where the only human right and the rights of the citizens situate. The third chapter locates on the degree of the rights of the citizen and studies Arendt’s idea of the implication between civil and political rights through the magnifying lens of the foundation. Lastly, the article shows that Arendt appeals to international law as a worldly federation of conciliar states, while she invokes the cosmopolitan law for the guarantee of the only human right against the only crime against the mankind: the cosmopolitical domain lies outside the spatial organization of the people.
