The relationships between phenomenology and psychophysics are investigated in the paper, examining some emblematic works. The aim is to actually devise aspects that could characterize "experimental phenomenology", although it often util-
izes conceptual devices and experimental paradigms borrowed from psychophys-
ics. Different experimental typologies are suggested: some works are directed to
discover or ascertain effects; others point to measure or to explain visual phenomena. There is no specific experimental paradigm characterizing phenomenal approach to perception; experiments are differently structured, according to the specific requirements. This, far from demonstrating the impossibility of an experimental phenomenology, allows to observe that this area, defined in primis in the theo-
retical domain, is not identified by methodological instruments. The problem we
must address is not whether experimentation in phenomenology is practicable, but, more in general, whether psychological research in perception has self-sufficiency
and significance.
