I engage with Kittay's theory of moral status and obligations towards people with severe cogni-tive disabilities. While I certainly agree with the inclusion of people with cognitive disabilities in moral personhood, I disagree with Kittay’s strategy, which rests in part on the distinction be-tween the moral status of humans and nonhuman animals, leading to the exclusion of the latter. I present a counterargument to Kittay’s position regarding the unjust exclusion of nonhuman animals from the sphere of moral personhood. She emphasizes relational identities and care in the definition of human worth as specific aspects of the moral relation of the human that ground its higher moral worth. I disagree with the thesis that these aspects are specific to hu-man relations and thus define humans' privileged moral status. Kittay's rejection of the compar-ison between humans with disabilities and nonhuman animals is subject to the challenge of species narcissism and hierarchical views that privilege humans. I propose to extend Kittay's re-lational perspective to nonhuman animals by emphasizing the interconnectedness of all sentient beings. This favours a more inclusive and compassionate approach and promotes a more just society that values the well-being of all living beings and challenges hierarchical moral value sys-tems.
